Intelligence Files and Location Tracking: PIBA Prepares for Covert Surveillance of Citizens and Foreign Nationals

In recent months, during our campaign against the “Surveillance Law,” a concerning document submitted by the Population and Immigration Authority (PIBA) to the Ministry of Finance’s Tender Committee has been exposed. The document concerns a request to contract the intelligence company PenLink as an external supplier intended to provide intelligence services to PIBA. The disturbing document was exposed by journalist Keren Cohen-Kivelä (a community member and investigative journalist) as part of her investigative report published on the “Shomrim” website (also published in “Calcalist”), describing the Authority’s preparations for covert and invasive surveillance of Israeli citizens and foreign nationals.

Yesterday, 17.5.26, the Israeli Association for International Couples, together with the Privacy Law Clinic at Tel Aviv University and the Association for Civil Rights in Israel, submitted a demand letter to the Ministry of Finance, PIBA, and the Office of the Attorney General. In our letter, we argued that the Population and Immigration Authority’s engagement with PenLink must be prevented due to the lack of legal authority to carry out the requested actions and because of the severe violation of fundamental rights.

The system that sees everything: What is PIBA seeking to purchase?

In the professional opinion attached to the request, PIBA clarifies that it requires “valuable intelligence” and advanced analytical capabilities that it currently does not possess. PenLink, the selected company, is an American company that merged with the Israeli intelligence company Cobwebs Technologies, and was recently selected as a supplier of surveillance tools to the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement unit (ICE). The company offers a range of capabilities, originally intended for intelligence and security agencies:

• Cellular location tracking based on advertisements (ADINT): The system exploits data sent from applications and digital advertising systems (ADID) in order to reconstruct the location and movement history of mobile devices. This capability allows the Authority to track a person’s movements in real time, over extended periods, without the need for a judicial warrant.
• Invasive social media monitoring (OSINT): The system provides access to more than 60 countries and local social networks. It is capable of extracting “multi-layered information,” including from closed profiles (for example, through friends’ tags in photos) and information about membership in closed groups.
• Artificial intelligence-based analysis (Gen-AI): The system uses artificial intelligence to cross-reference data from different sources and build detailed “intelligence files” on “targets.” The Authority’s stated goal is to carry out “continuous analysis” in order to identify deviations from routine, and to allow officials to formulate queries that the system will “respond” to based on the data it collected.
• Operational accessibility in the field: The system includes a dedicated application for field officials, allowing them to run large-scale batch queries in real time – a function primarily relevant to border control.

The Population and Immigration Authority seeks to place the above tools in the hands of all of its administrations, including the Border Control Administration, the Enforcement and Foreigners Administration, and the Population Administration – the body responsible, among other things, for handling applications for status regularization based on a relationship. In PIBA’s professional opinion, it openly declares its intention to operate the system against a broad range of targets, both Israeli citizens and foreign nationals, and specifically mentions the “gradual process” as one of its primary targets.

There is no doubt that one of the central groups that will be affected is the international couples community, whose center of life and relationships are subject to continuous and invasive examination over the course of years. In addition, monitoring and surveillance at varying levels of intensity will be applied to all status applicants in Israel, including tourists, work migrants, and particularly vulnerable groups such as asylum seekers, victims of human trafficking, and individuals involved in humanitarian procedures. More seriously, the system’s capabilities allow the Authority to build intelligence files also on “close circles” – meaning that family members, friends, and acquaintances of those under examination may also find themselves under surveillance, solely because of their connection to status applicants.

“Everything is already exposed on the internet anyway”

Even if PIBA claims that this concerns “public” information from social networks, this is a harmful and dangerous practice. It is important to distinguish between “manual examination” of public information and the use of Data Scraping technologies and intelligence processing: whereas manual examination is generally reactive and intended to verify a specific claim raised by the applicant, data scraping enables systematic, large-scale, and covert collection of data from numerous sources simultaneously. There is a profound difference between the two in terms of the expectation of privacy; people express themselves and share content on social networks for diverse social, personal, or professional purposes, and they have no expectation or consent that the state will use this information for intelligence purposes in order to build a “personal file” on them, analyze their center of life, or map their social circles.

The very existence of such a surveillance system creates a “chilling effect.” When a person knows that their location, social connections, and digital activity are being systematically monitored by a governmental authority, they fear expressing themselves freely or maintaining an autonomous way of life.

Moreover, PenLink’s system is not merely a technical tool for collecting information; it purports to “analyze” and draw conclusions. The idea that life-changing decisions – such as the right to live with one’s partner or the registration of a child – will be based on an algorithm of a private company operating as a “black box” violates the fundamental rights to dignity, privacy, and equality, even without addressing the technological problems that exist in artificial intelligence systems and phenomena such as “hallucinations” and other errors.

Our main arguments

Yesterday (17.5.2026), the Israeli Association for International Couples (AIC), together with the Privacy Law Clinic at Tel Aviv University and the Association for Civil Rights in Israel, submitted a strongly worded objection letter to the Tender Committee. Our main arguments are:

1. Lack of authority and deviation from the principle of administrative legality: The Population and Immigration Authority is not authorized to carry out detective activities, tracking, and intelligence processing. In the absence of explicit authorization in law, these actions are illegal.
2. Severe violation of constitutional rights, including those of citizens and minors: The system violates the constitutional right to privacy and the right to family life, both protected under Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.
3. Prohibited delegation of governmental authority: The state seeks to transfer the core of discretionary authority – determining who is considered “suspect” or “exceptional” – into the hands of a private commercial company that is not subject to the duties of trust and transparency that apply to the public service.

Read the demand letter (Hebrew)

What happens next?

PIBA’s request to contract PenLink has not yet been approved, and we continue to closely monitor developments. Our fight against the engagement with PenLink is a direct continuation of our fight against the “Surveillance Law.” We demand that the Ministry of Finance reject PIBA’s request and prohibit the Population and Immigration Authority from operating surveillance measures and intelligence software against citizens.

If our position is not accepted and the request is approved, we are determined to proceed with a petition to the High Court of Justice against the decision and against the PIBA’s claims.

We would like to thank the Privacy Clinic at Tel Aviv University and the Association for Civil Rights in Israel for their important collaboration, close engagement, and continued attention to this matter.

This is a struggle over the character of the state and over privacy within our own homes. We need your support in order to continue the legal efforts, our parliamentary activity in the Knesset, and the exposure of attempts to harm our rights. Donate to AIC today to support these efforts.